




Virtually ignored by academics, the business trust arguably is the most prominent organi-
zational form used today. This claim is disputable essentially only insofar that no one 
knows the actual composition, scale, and volume of trusts used for commercial  purposes.1 
Yet no one doubts that trusts are the dominant form for massive employee pensions 
and mutual funds, as well as for a myriad of asset securitization and structured finance 
transactions.2
The multi- trillion dollar question is why.3 To arrive at an answer, one first must 
delve into the historical origin and growth of  the business trust. Grasping this in turn 
enables one to comprehend and evaluate the diverse modern permutations of  this 
organizational form, which has been described as a “mystery” with a “secret life.”4 
Demystifying the business trust is difficult, because it has the ability to assume many 
different forms, bear many labels, and perform many functions. This versatility resists 
the conventional approach of  using a template of  features (e.g., formation, limited 
liability, management structure, transferability) to compare the business trust to other 
types of  organizational forms. Instead, the common functions of  the business trust 
are delineated to evince some of  its objective merits and, incidentally, its comparative 
advantages over other forms.
 1 See, e.g., Robert Flannigan, Business Applications of the Express Trust, 36 Alta. L. Rev. 630, 
630 (1998) (“The extent to which the trust is employed to serve commercial purposes is unknown 
and probably unknowable.”). Part of the problem is a lack of reliable data, as there is no registra-
tion requirement for trusts. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as 
an Instrument of Commerce, 107 Yale L.J. 165, 178 (1997) (“The data available on the asset values 
of the various forms of trust has many shortcomings, but the drift is unmistakable. . . . [T]he data 
leave[ ] me on solid ground asserting . . . that well above 90% of the wealth in trust in the United 
States is held in commercial as opposed to personal trusts.”). This problem is compounded by the 
“considerable conceptual difficulty in distinguishing between commercial and non- commercial 
activities,” Flannigan, supra, at 631, as well as between business and commercial activities, 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: Unraveling the Mystery, 58 Bus. 
Law. 559, 562 n.18 (2003).
 2 See, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust as “Uncorporation”: A Research Agenda, 2005 U. Ill. 
L. Rev. 31, 38.
 3 See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 1, at 168–78 (estimating conservatively $11.6 trillion in com-
mercial trusts almost two decades ago).
 4 See supra note 1.
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2. THE NASCENT BUSINESS TRUST
From Britain to Massachusetts
The business trust arose as a subversive alternate to the British company. In response to 
numerous speculative commercial ventures gone awry, Parliament enacted the Bubble Act 
of 1720, requiring all corporate forms with transferable stock to obtain formal permis-
sion to do business “either by act of Parliament, or by a charter from the Crown,”5 which 
thereby “drastically limited the development of business corporations in Britain.”6 But 
these corporations were not the target of the Bubble Act; rather, the legislation’s aim was 
to eliminate the slew of voluntary associations that had emerged as a way to circumvent 
the charter requirement. And after Parliament repealed the Bubble Act in 1825, these 
voluntary associations re- flourished. By the 1860s British investors began to flock to what 
became known as the investment trust, “the earliest of [which] were unincorporated, of a 
voluntary nature, and of a fiduciary character, and hence were called trusts in accordance 
with the custom of that time.”7 Although registration later was required by the Companies 
Acts, these voluntary associations were permitted to retain their form as a trust.8
Across the Atlantic business trusts already had begun to germinate in a  concurrent, 
similar manner. Decades before the Companies Acts, various American state  legislatures 
had enacted their own general incorporation statutes; and all of these statutes  prohibited 
use of the corporate form for real estate, an apparent hold- over from  medieval English 
mortmain statutes.9 To circumvent this  prohibition, real  property owners formed business 
trusts, which also were not subject to any of the capital limits or regulatory disclosure 
requirements applicable to corporations.10
The incubator for these alternate corporate forms was Massachusetts. Although 
it was the first state to enact a general incorporation statute in 1809, Massachusetts 
was one of  the last to permit incorporation without legislative sanction.11 And, like 
other states, Massachusetts prohibited corporations from dealing in real estate,12 which 
in turn spawned the use of  business trusts. But what set Massachusetts apart was a 
series of  early court decisions ruling that real estate business ventures would be treated 
as trusts, and not as corporations or partnerships, in matters of  tax13 and limited 
 5 6 Geo. I c. 18 (1720).
 6 Ronald E. Seavoy, The Public Service Origins of the American Business Corporation, 52 Bus. 
Hist. Rev. 30, 32 (1978).
 7 Theodore J. Grayson, Investment Trusts, Their Origin, Development and Operation 
1–2 (1928).
 8 See The Companies Acts, 25 & 26 Vict. ch. 89, § 180 (1862).
 9 See Sheldon A. Jones et al., The Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered Investment 
Companies, 13 Del. J. Corp. L. 421, 426 (1988) (citing Report of the Massachusetts Tax 
Commissioner on Voluntary Associations, Mass. House Rep. No. 1646, at 2 (1912)).
10 Cf. Mass. Pub. Stat. tit. XV, ch. 106, § 14 (1882).
11 See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Statutory Developments in Business Corporation Law, 50 
Harv. L. Rev. 27, 31 (1936).
12 Id.
13 See, e.g., Williams v. Inhabitants of Milton, 102 N.E. 355 (Mass. 1913); see also 
Wheeler A. Rosenbalm, Comment, The Massachusetts Trust, 31 Tenn. L. Rev. 471, 472–76 (1964).
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 liability.14 By  recognizing these ventures as a distinct commercial entity, Massachusetts 
courts “provide[d] a hospitable environment for the business trust”15 whose jurisdic-
tional superiority was so manifest that these entities became known as “Massachusetts 
Trusts.”16
Numerous advantages set this commercial form apart from its rivals. As with other 
 jurisdictions, business trusts in Massachusetts were not subject to any minimum or 
maximum capital limits, nor were they subject to the annual financial disclosure require-
ments that applied to corporations.17 But equally important, investors held only a 
beneficial interest within, and a not a share of, a Massachusetts Trust, and thus had 
“no right to manage it by themselves nor to instruct the trustees how to manage it for 
them”;18 to obtain, much less exercise, any control over the trustees would result in the 
entity being treated as a general partnership, and not a Massachusetts Trust.19 On the 
other hand, though, Massachusetts business trustees were not afforded limited liability 
or indemnification protection that corporate directors enjoy;20 absent an exculpatory 
clause, Massachusetts business trustees were allowed only an equitable right to reimburse 
themselves for  “obligations incurred for the benefit of the trust.”21
From Common Law to Statutory Trusts
Until the early 1900s the business trust thrived in the common law.22 On the one hand, 
the business trust thus represented an attractive alternative to the myriad of statutory 
limitations and regulations applicable to early corporations and later also general part-
nerships.23 On the other hand, a consequence of being grounded in the law of trusts 
was that business trusts were not a legal entity, and thus only could sue (or be sued) and 
transact in the name of the trustee. All of this was compounded by judicial confusion 
and  inconsistency across jurisdictions about how to treat business trusts.24 And in some 
14 See, e.g., Dolben v. Gleason, 198 N.E. 762 (Mass. 1935).
15 Jones et al., supra note 9, at 429.
16 See, e.g., Edward H. Warren, Corporate Advantages Without Incorporation 328 
(1929) (“A business trust is often called a Massachusetts Trust, because such trusts have probably 
been used in Massachusetts more than in any other one state.”).
17 See supra notes 13–14.
18 Williams, 102 N.E. at 357.
19 See, e.g., Frost v. Thompson, 106 N.E. 1009 (Mass. 1914). The right to elect trustees initially was 
among the disqualifying types of control, but later was held not to result in treatment as a partnership. 
See Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation v. City of Springfield, 71 N.E.2d 593 (Mass. 1947).
20 See, e.g., Dolben v. Gleason, 198 N.E. 762, 763 (Mass. 1935) (“[I]n the absence of a stipula-
tion to the contrary a trustee is personally liable in an action on a contract made by him for the 
benefit of the trust estate.”).
21 Town of Hull v. Tong, 442 N.E.2d 427, 429 (Mass. 1982).
22 See, e.g., Sitkoff, supra note 2, at 32 (“In the late 1800s and early 1900s, before the corporate 
form had matured, the common- law business trust . . . was a strong competitor to corporation as a 
mode of business organization.”).
23 See Uniform Partnership Act (1914). See also William C. Dunn, Trusts for Business 
Purposes 230–68 (1922).
24 See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, The Delaware Business Trust Act Failure as the New 
Corporate  Law, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 325, 326 n.4 (2001) (citing Herbert B. Chermside, Jr., 
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 jurisdictions the business trust even was denounced altogether as an “impermissible 
evasion of local corporate law.”25
These developments did not escape the attention of the federal government. In 1939 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) undertook a massive study of business 
trusts, specifically those used in connection with securities investments, and released a 
multi- volume report.26 Although that report did examine trusts with individual investors, 
as well as Massachusetts Trusts,27 the SEC was far more interested in the use of struc-
tures such as “a pyramided system of investment companies, based upon one company 
holding a controlling block of stock of other investment companies and noninvestment 
companies.”28 In direct response to the increasing use of trusts for mutual funds and 
investment companies Congress implemented the Investment Company Act of 1940.29
Waves of state trust statutes then followed during the 1960s and 1980s, including 
Delaware’s contribution in 1988.30 The reason for this surge in trust regulation is not 
entirely clear, but one distinct possibility is an apparent consensus among jurisdictions 
by the late 1950s that “employment of trust in the carrying on of trade or business” was 
“per se imprudent unless expressly authorized by the trust instrument.”31 Accordingly, 
state legislatures perhaps decided to take matters into their own hands to eschew any 
confusion or uncertainty within the common law about whether trusts could be used for 
business or commercial purposes. Delaware, for instance, reportedly adopted its Act for 
the “principal purpose of . . . recogniz[ing] the statutory trust as an alternate form of 
business organization.”32
Not surprisingly, Delaware crafted a pivotal business trust statute. Interestingly, 
Delaware’s Statutory Trust Act appears in Title 12, “Decedents’ Estates and Fiduciary 
Relations,” and not within Title 6, “Commerce and Trade,” where all other business 
Annotation, Modern Status of the Massachusetts or Business Trust, 88 A.L.R.3d 704 (1978 & 
Supp. 2001)).
25 Sitkoff, supra note 2, at 36 (citing Leland S. Duxbury, Business Trusts and Blue Sky Laws, 8 
Minn. L. Rev. 465 (1924)).
26 See I Securities and Exchange Commission, Investment Trusts and Investment 
Companies, Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission Pursuant to Section 30 
of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (1939) (hereinafter SEC, Investment 
Trusts).
27 See, e.g., id. at 29–34.
28 Id. at 100.
29 See, e.g., IV SEC, Investment Trusts, supra note 26, at 383 (describing the 1940 Act 
as being designed “to eliminate and prevent deficiencies and abuses in these organizations”). 
For a more detailed examination of  the 1940 Act’s impact on trusts, see, for example, Thomas 
S.  Harman, Emerging Alternatives to Mutual Funds: Unit Investment Trusts and Other Fixed 
Portfolio Investment Vehicles, 1987 Duke L.J. 1045; Jay B. Gould & Gerald T. Lins, Unit 
Investment Trusts: Structure and Regulation Under the Federal Securities Laws, 43 Bus. Law. 1177 
(1988).
30 According to one prominent commentator, there are “perhaps as many as four generations 
of business trust legislation,” with the first being colonial acts such as the Massachusetts statute, 
followed by those in the 1960s, then “legislation passed in the 1980s but before the Delaware Act,” 
and finally post 1988 enactments. Sitkoff, supra note 2, at 36.
31 Id. at 37 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 227 cmt. f  (1959)).
32 Wendell Fenton & Eric A. Mazie, Delaware Statutory Trusts, in The Delaware Law of 
Corporations & Business Organizations § 19.2 (9th ed. 2004 Supp.).
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organizations are located; nevertheless, the statute defines a “statutory trust” as “an 
unincorporated association” that:
(1) Is created by a governing instrument under which property is or will be held, managed, 
administered, controlled, invested, reinvested and/or operated, or business or professional activi-
ties for profit are carried on or will be carried on, by a trustee or trustees . . . including but not 
limited to a trust of the type known at common law as a “business trust,” or “Massachusetts 
trust,” or a [Real Estate Investment Trust].33
And, consistent with its approach to all business organizations, Delaware treats a statu-
tory business trust as a “separate legal entity,”34 subject to “maximum effect to the prin-
ciple of freedom of contract.”35 Accordingly, while “the laws of [Delaware] pertaining to 
trusts are hereby made applicable to statutory trusts,”36 they still benefit from the same 
contractarian framework that contributes to the state’s durable dominance as the jurisdic-
tion of choice for all other business entities.
Delaware’s statute also implemented two significant refinements. First, the statute 
resolved a persistent common law ambiguity about the partitioning of the business trust’s 
assets from the personal assets of beneficiaries and owners; as the statute now makes clear, 
beneficial owners are “entitled to the same limitation of personal liability extended to 
stockholders of private corporations for profit,” and no personal liability can be imposed 
on a trustee unless provided by contract.37 Second, as is the case for its limited liability 
companies, Delaware adopted a laissez faire conception of trustees’ fiduciary duties, in 
that they “may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the governing 
instrument” beyond the “implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing”;38 
accordingly, unlike other jurisdictions, Delaware features a complete opt- out regime as to 
whether any kind of trust- based duties of care or loyalty exist.39 In these regards, then, 
Delaware’s statutory business trusts offer some of the same fundamental benefits that the 
state’s most popular business organization forms do, leading some to conclude that, “[i]n 
theory, any entity that can be formed as a business corporation, an LLC, an LLP, or an 
LLLP could be formed instead as a statutory business trust.”40
Currently at least 18 states have some type of business trust statute. And at least 29 
33 Del. Code Ann. tit. 12 § 3801(g)(1) (2012).
34 Id. at § 3801(g)(2); see also I.R.S. Rev. Rul. 2004- 86 (ruling that Delaware statutory trusts are 
a separate entity that “will be classified as a trust for federal tax purposes”).
35 Del. Code Ann. tit. 12 § 3825(b) (2012). See also Frankel, supra note 24, at 326–27 (“[T]
his marvelous contract- like organizational form, [with] its liberal contractarian approach and the 
freedom to . . . take on such characteristics of traditional inter vivos trusts, business trusts, corpora-
tions, or partnerships . . . may be the greatest advantage of the business trust over alternative forms 
of business organizations.”); Professor Frankel, however, offers some persuasive criticisms that the 
Delaware act actually fails to deliver fully on these promises. See generally id.
36 Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3809 (2012).
37 Id. at § 3803; see also id. at § 3817 (providing for trustee indemnification). However, beneficial 
owners do have a right to bring a derivative action against a trustee, id. at § 3816.
38 Id. at § 3806(c).
39 See, e.g., Sitkoff, supra note 2, at 38 (“[T]rust law’s more rigorous duties of loyalty and care 
. . . appear to be incorporated by reference by the modern business trust statutes.”).
40 Henry Hansmann et al., The New Entities in Historical Perspective, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 5, 
14; see also infra notes 68–78 and accompanying text.
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states have legislation permitting the trust for business or commercial uses,41 while 47 
states have provisions that at least recognize the existence of a statutory trust.42 The 
most recent, significant contribution is the Uniform Statutory Trust Entity Act, which 
was introduced in 2009 and has been adopted by two jurisdictions.43 Slowly, but surely, 
the statutory business trust is becoming an established part of the business organizations 
landscape.
3. THE MODERN BUSINESS TRUST
The business trust is a mercurial entity that resists precise definition. The most “current” 
definition from the Supreme Court was formulated in 1924,44 well before states proceeded 
to enact multiple generations of business trust statutes. But most of  these recent statutes 
do not displace common law trusts; on the contrary, these statutes typically “provide that 
the common law of trusts applies unless otherwise displaced by a specific statutory pro-
vision or the terms of the trust instrument.”45 Moreover, jurisdictions such as Delaware 
subscribe to an overt contractarian approach, conferring parties with tremendous flex-
ibility in constructing and operating a business trust. All of  this suggests that trying to 
define the business trust may not be necessary to understand it—all we have to do is see 
it at work.46
41 Cf. id. at 35–36 (“The existing literature . . . puts the count of states with general business 
trust legislation anywhere from seventeen to thirty- four. Based on fresh electronic searches, I put 
the current count at twenty- nine.”) (citing sources).
42 My electronic searches revealed that only the state codes of Indiana, New Mexico, and 
Vermont lack any reference to the term “statutory trust.”
43 See Uniform Law Commission, Statutory Trust Entity Act, http://uniformlaws.org/Act.
aspx?title=Statutory%20Trust%20Entity%20Act (last visited August 23, 2014) (listing the District 
of Columbia and Kentucky as having adopted the model act).
44 In a case concerning the applicability of the Revenue Act of 1916 to three Massachusetts 
trustees, the court stated:
The “Massachusetts Trust” is a form of business organization . . . consisting essentially of an 
arrangement whereby property is conveyed to trustees, in accordance with the terms of an instru-
ment of trust, to be held and managed of such persons as may from time to time be the holders 
of transferable certificates issued by the trustees showing the shares into which the beneficial 
interest in the property is divided. These certificates . . . entitle the holders to share ratably in the 
income of the property, and, upon termination of the trust, in the proceeds. (Hecht v. Malley, 
265 U.S. 144, 146 (1924) (Sanford, J.)) 
This evidently remains the operative definition used by the court. See Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 
446 U.S. 458, 467–68 (1980) (“In Hecht v. Malley . . . this Court described the Massachusetts busi-
ness trust in terms that have come to be accepted as the classic definition”) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (citing 16A R. Eickhoff, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §8228 
(1979)).
45 Sitkoff, supra note 2, at 38.
46 Cf. Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (“I shall not today attempt further to define 
the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps 
I could never succeed intelligibly in doing so. But I know it when I see it”) (Stewart, J., concurring); 
The Departed (2006) (“I know what you are, and what you aren’t.”) (Mark Wahlberg aka Det. Sgt. 
Dignam).
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One useful approach is to view business trusts through a taxonomy. According to one 
prominent commentator,
[c]ommercial trusts can be categorized in two ways: by the “type” of trust, where labels have been 
given to commercial trusts, and by the business use to which the trust has been placed. Both ways 
are needed because there is sometimes an imprecise correlation between labels and functions: 
certain entities called trusts are not trusts, and other entities may be trusts even though they do 
not go by that name.47
While not without merit, cataloging the entire universe of business trusts by label or name 
is a difficult, and perhaps futile, exercise. Past attempts have been helpful in identifying 
a broad range of business trust- like entities, but many of them can be denominated or 
described in multiple ways;48 moreover, this population is potentially too numerous to 
yield a wieldy list.49
The superior approach is thus to focus just on different functions. Business trusts have 
at least five discrete, categorical functions: (1) property holding, (2) asset securitization, 
(3) risk management, (4) pooled asset management, and (5) tax advantages. Each of these 
applied features of the business trust is described concisely here, with reference to more 
detailed treatment in academic literature.
Property Holding
Trusts are a useful commercial vehicle for simply holding property. This is because trusts 
serve as an intermediary entity through which developers or owners can transact via a 
trustee, without having to reveal their own identity.50 Trusts also can facilitate transac-
tions involving multiple parties by having property centralized within the custody and 
control of a trustee.51 Typically, the trustee performs the function of “nothing more than 
a nominee or ‘bare’ trustee . . . [who] holds the legal title, but has no power to deal inde-
pendently with the property.”52 In both scenarios the operative rationale is a mitigation 
of collective action problems; shielding identities can avoid potential hold- out problems 
by third- parties, while representation by a fiduciary can reduce the number of creditors 
or litigants who are directly involved in decision- making.
This rationale is clearly illustrated by transactions under the Trust Indenture Act of 
1939. When, for example, a corporate entity issues debt securities, a trustee is appointed to 
represent the interests of all securityholders. Effective representation is possible because 
while the indenture is by and between the issuer and trustee, the latter has no control, 
custody, or right of the property unless a default occurs, and instead bears fiduciary duties 
that inure to the benefit of securityholders.53 By occupying this peculiar intermediary role 
47 Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 563–64.
48 Compare, e.g., id. at 566–73, with Langbein, supra note 1, at 168–77.
49 See, e.g., id. (listing at least 12 distinct types of business trusts).
50 See, e.g., Flannigan, supra note 1, at 631.
51 Id. at 631 and 633.
52 Id. at 632.
53 See, e.g., id. (“The trust is associated with a notorious set of default fiduciary rules and prin-
ciples that . . . is a considerable convenience to settlors . . .”).
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between the issuer and the securityholders, the trustee serves to “overcome[ ] the coordina-
tion problem that inheres in widespread public ownership of debt securities.”54
Asset Securitization
Business trusts also serve an integral role in structured finance deals. Although data on 
the size of the structured finance market are elusive, $21.7 billion in asset- backed secu-
rities were traded in 2013,55 a large fraction of which “is financed—or somewhat more 
accurately, refinanced—through asset securitization trusts.”56 Undoubtedly, even after 
the recent global financial crisis, structured finance continues to thrive, and it does so 
primarily in the form of the business trust.
In this arena the trust typically serves as a special purpose entity (SPE). Although the 
range of potential transactions is diverse, in essence an operating company can transfer 
assets (e.g., receivables) or even liabilities (e.g., mortgages) to a trust, which in turn issues 
securities to third- party investors, whose cash largely will flow back to the company.57 
The trust thus performs a crucial function as an intermediating shield; while the company 
enjoys a lack of privity with investors, the SPE trust’s “bankruptcy remote” status protects 
investors should the company become insolvent.58
Risk Management
Related to its role in securitization, business trusts diversify risk. Traditionally, lenders 
would guard against overextended liabilities by selling undivided interests to other 
banks;59 under this approach, however, selling each interest to a separate bank quickly 
accrued substantial transaction costs to achieve a level of sufficient diversification.60
Instead, businesses use a variety of different types of trusts. Rather than the traditional 
method, a simple statutory business trust can diversify risk easily by the issuance of trust 
certificates, with a so- called residual class that is retained by the lender for the purposes 
of recouping any remaining value after all senior investors have been paid as well as 
providing an incentive for the lender to monitor the originating debtor’s financial situ-
ation.61 Another common diversification vehicle is a master trust, which enables a party 
to create multiple classes of trust certificates for a specific set of financial assets; as with 
54 Langbein, supra note 1, at 174.
55 See Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, US SF Trading Volume, www.
sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx (last visited August 29, 2014).
56 Langbein, supra note 1, at 172 (reporting “’[p]atchy Federal Reserve data show[ing] nearly 
$1.9 trillion in mortgage pools,” albeit in 1996).
57 For an excellent diagram of this structured transaction, see, for example, Paul Halpern & 
Oyvind Norli, Canadian Business Trusts: A New Organizational Structure, 18 J. App. Corp. Fin. 
66, 67 fig.1 (2006) (“Business Trust Structure”). And for excellent information and insight into 
the benefits of asset securitization, see Steven L. Schwarcz, What Is Securitization? And for What 
Purpose? 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1283 (2012).
58 See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 564; Langbein, supra note 1, at 173.
59 See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 565.
60 See, e.g., id. at 565–66.
61 See, e.g., id.
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 corporations, different classes can have entirely different terms, which can appeal to a 
broader population of potential investors and thus increase the amount of investments.62
Pooled Asset Management
The majority of pension and mutual funds are organized as trusts.63 Pension funds assume 
this form because the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) “codi-
fies the central principles of trust fiduciary law, and ERISA’s legislative history makes 
clear that Congress meant to track the common law of trusts.”64 In contrast mutual 
funds have a choice to form either as an investment company or investment trust, but the 
 majority reportedly favor the latter option.65
Trusts are preferred pooled investment vehicles for multiple reasons. Beyond ERISA’s 
mandatory regulatory framework,66 pension funds resort to the trust for its structural 
relationship with beneficiaries, since undistributed funds may be transferred to a pension 
plan owner’s survivors; in this way, “the pension trust exhibits a hybrid trait: Although it 
is a commercial trust, it commonly gives rise to a gratuitous transfer.”67
The trust rationale for mutual funds, however, is far more complex. As one prominent 
commentator has observed, “[t]here are not . . . clear answers to the fundamental question 
of whether trusts are a better form of business organization than corporations . . . .”68 
According to the commentator, one possibility is that the corporate form may be better 
suited for more unilaterally aggressive mutual funds, because the presence of strong 
limited liability and the Business Judgment Rule may shield managers from litigation 
risks, versus “where all of the fund’s beneficiaries want the manager to take these risks, 
there would be no real conflicting interests, and the trust form is sufficient.”69 This seems 
somewhat dubious, given that the Investment Company Act of 1940 provides identical 
fiduciary standards to managers of investment companies and investment trusts.70
A more plausible reason is governance. The choice of entity for mutual fund managers 
largely is not between a trust and a generic corporation, but rather what is known as the 
62 See, e.g., id. at 567.
63 See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 1, at 168–71 and 178; Flannigan, supra note 1, at 633 (“Most 
mutual funds in Canada are in fact trusts.”).
64 Langbein, supra note 1, at 169 (citing sources).
65 Id. at 171.
66 Cf. id. at 169 (“Actually, the federal policy of promoting the trust form for pension funds is 
older than ERISA.”).
67 Id. at 170; see also Paul B. Miller, The Future for Business Trusts: A Comparative Analysis 
of Canadian and American Uniform Legislation, 36 Queen’s L.J. 443, 449 (2011) (“The popularity 
of the trust for managing funds is understandable given similarities between the management of 
pooled assets of multiple investors and the management of trust property for multiple beneficiaries 
of an ordinary private donative trust.”).
68 Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 560 (noting also the vagaries of the trust’s superiority over part-
nerships); see also Langbein, supra note 1, at 188 (“[W]e should in principle be able to specify why 
one or the other prevails in a particular setting. I am not yet able to do this.”).
69 Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 571.
70 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b, 80a- 1 to 80a- 64, 80b- 1 to 80b- 21 (1994). See also Miller, supra note 67, 
at 450 (“As in corporations, [trust] management is subject to fiduciary strictures to guard against 
careless and disloyalty.”).
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Maryland corporation. According to a survey, “half  of all newly organized mutual funds 
took the form of [Massachusetts business] trusts, but . . . a further 28% were organized 
as Maryland corporations.”71 During the late 1980s Maryland’s legislature revamped 
its corporation statute “to ape the flexibility of the commercial trust in governance.”72 
Specifically, Maryland investment company boards are not required to hold annual meet-
ings merely for informational purposes,73 thereby avoiding “attendant proxy costs, one of 
the distinctive advantages of trust- type mutual funds,”74 and may modify unilaterally the 
aggregate number of shares.75
The business trust, however, features a unique structural advantage. In essence the 
trustee can be understood as “two distinct legal persons: a natural person contracting on 
behalf  of himself, and an artificial person acting on behalf  of the beneficiaries.”76 The 
distinction turns on asset partitioning, whereby the trustee represents an agent whose per-
sonal assets are shielded from any of the trust’s creditors while the trust is managed by a 
“de facto office of the trustee” that “serves as the organizing hub for the various relations 
that aggregate into the trust.”77 Put differently, individual trustees can come and go, but 
the office of the trustee is a stable entity that actually performs the function of handling 
all of the trust’s creditors and facing their claims. And, most crucially, “[t]his creation of 
two distinct persons c[an] not feasibly be reproduced with explicit contracting” due to 
excessive transaction costs.78 No exact structural counterpart exists within any other kind 
of business organization, including the Maryland corporation.
Tax Advantages
Tax considerations also cannot be discounted from the business trust. Pursuant to the 
Check- the- Box regulations, American business trusts are not treated the same as so- called 
“ordinary,” or donative, trusts, but rather as a business entity;79 nevertheless, under this 
regime, business trusts can elect to be taxed on a “pass- through” basis, thereby avoiding 
the entity- level tax applied to all corporations.80 And for those business trusts beyond 
the reach of the Check- the- Box regulations, the same effect can be obtained by utilizing 
internal debt to offset any profits, with cash distributed in the more favorably taxed form 
71 Langbein, supra note 1, at 187 (citing Jones et al., supra note 9, at 422).
72 Id.
73 See Md. Ann. Code § 2- 501 (requiring an annual meeting only when there is an 
 election of directors, approval of  the investment advisory agreement, ratification of  selection 
of  independent accountants, or approval of  a distribution agreement). See also Jones et  al., 
supra  note 9, at 422 n.5 (describing some interpretative ambiguities within this statutory 
provision).
74 Langbein, supra note 1, at 187.
75 See Md. Ann. Code § 2- 105.
76 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 Yale 
L.J. 387, 416 (2000).
77 Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 621, 641 
(2004).
78 Id. at 632 (citing Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A 
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 434, 466 (1998)).
79 See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701- 4(a)–(c) (2014).
80 See id. at § 301.7701- 2.
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of interest, rather than as capital gains or dividends.81 Moreover, unlike partnerships, 
business trusts functioning as pension funds or other types of retirement accounts have 
their tax deferred to a later period, thereby yielding further gains.82
Summary
Business trusts can bear many names and assume an even greater number of forms. More 
importantly, business trusts can perform multiple functions in a wide variety of settings, 
only some of which have been described here. At the risk of stating the obvious, these 
functions are neither mutually exclusive nor singularly dispositive in explaining why busi-
ness trusts are preferred in certain industries or transactions. On the contrary the diverse 
array of functions and context in which business trusts thrive bespeaks to a versatility that 
few other organizational forms can exhibit; this advantage is only reinforced when one 
considers the contractual flexibility permitted in business trust instruments, particularly 
in laissez faire jurisdictions such as Delaware. Accordingly, the pertinent question is not 
really why business trusts exist, but rather why they are not used to an even greater extent 
than what the available data already suggest.83
4. CONCLUSIONS
Despite its venerable history, the business trust continues to be a dynamic organizational 
form. Over the past two centuries the business trust has evolved from an almost purely 
common law creature into a contractarian entity governed by modern statutory defaults 
that incorporate traditional trust principles. Recent academic and legislative attention 
only promise to further refine the business trust and unlock its true potential.
For this to occur, however, a great deal of work remains to be done. Among the most 
significant and pressing deficiencies with regard to the business trust is a virtual dearth 
of empirical evidence. Official and private regulatory bodies here and abroad currently 
do not compile reliable, much less textured, data on the frequency, scale, and types of 
business trusts in use, despite clear indications of their ubiquity. Moreover, we lack even 
any anecdotal evidence from users of business trusts about why they have chosen that 
form over any other alternatives. Finally, there are thousands of published legal decisions 
concerning business trusts, which would benefit from systematic treatment of the issues 
that tend to arise with these entities. Obtaining all of these sorts of information would 
go a long way to establishing a clear positive portrait about the business trust and how it 
enhances value in various settings and transactions.
There is also a fundamental conceptual issue that merits serious attention. The modern 
81 See, e.g., Halpern & Norli, supra note 57, at 70.
82 See, e.g., id.; Miller, supra note 67, at 451 (“Income trust conversions in Canada were largely 
driven by preferred tax status.”).
83 A plausible explanation may lie in network effects and status quo bias, whereby entrepre-
neurs favor more established and familiar types of organizations rather than the business trust. See, 
e.g., Sitkoff, supra note 2, at 46. Or perhaps the reason is simple ignorance. Regardless, the answer 
requires some empirical evidence.
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business trust is viewed conventionally from the robust contractarian approach, which 
fruitfully frames and guides our understanding of unincorporated and corporate entities; 
indeed, Delaware’s statute explicitly embraces contract as the natural legal foundation 
for business trust.84 But, at the same time, the trust is grounded in property law; this the 
basis for the materially distinct set of fiduciary relationships within trusts,85 as well as the 
structurally peculiar relationships between the trustee, the underlying res, and beneficiar-
ies.86 The relationship between contract and property is not mutually exclusive,87 and so 
perhaps the most apt characterization of the trust is as a “hybrid of contract and property, 
[where] . . . contractarian elements do[ ] not require disregard property components whose 
convenience abides.”88 But that nevertheless renders the business trust a meaningfully dif-
ferent kind of form than the partnership, corporation, and limited liability company.89 To 
be sure, all of these forms conform to various cost- structure or feature- based analysis.90 
The challenge, however, is not confined simply to finding some kind of golden thread that 
runs through the entire universe of business organizations; rather, the trust’s quirky nature 
presents a rich array of provocative questions about what is and potentially what should 
be the proper paradigmatic way to view business law in general.
84 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
85 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 Cornell L. 
Rev. 767, 768 (2000).
86 See, e.g., Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 78, at 147.
87 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 
Colum. L. Rev. 773 (2001).
88 Langbein, supra note 1, at 669; see also generally John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis 
of the Law of Trusts, 105 Yale L.J. 625 (1995).
89 Cf. Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 476–77 (1980) (questioning “the Court’s distinc-
tion between business trusts and . . . other enterprises . . . on the locus of title to the trust assets”) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
90 See generally Sitkoff, supra note 2; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 76. One also could 
apply an information or transaction cost analysis or focus on differences within the conventional 
matrix of attributes derived from the Kintner Regulations.
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